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1 introduction

There is a long history of the theoretical and empirical investigation of the labor supply decisions of married women. Perhaps the starting point for modern econometric analysis of this question is Heckman (1974), in which a neoclassical model of wives' labor supply was estimated using disaggregated data. He explicitly estimated the parameters characterizing a household utility function, which included as arguments the leisure levels of wives and household consumption. With the addition of a wage function, Heckman was able to consistently estimate household preference parameters and the wage function in a manner that eliminated the types of endogenous sampling problems known to create estimator bias when the participation decision is ignored.¹

Many researchers have estimated both static and dynamic household labor supply functions in the intervening years using models based on household utility function specifications, though in many cases the husband's labor supply decision has been treated as predetermined or exogenous. Over the last several decades, there has been a movement to view the family as a collection of agents with their own preferences who are united through the sharing of public goods, emotional ties, and production technologies. Household members are seen as often viewed as behaving strategically with respect to one another given their rather complicated and interconnected resource constraints. Analysis of these situations has focused on describing and analyzing cooperative equilibrium outcomes. Though models using the cooperative approach (e.g., Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), Chiappori (1988)) differ in many respects, they share the common characteristic of generating outcomes that are Pareto-efficient (the primary distinction between them being the method for selecting a point on the Pareto frontier). The noncooperative approach, which uses Nash equilibrium as an equilibrium concept (e.g. Leuthold (1968), Bourgignon (1984), Del Boca and Flinn (1995), Chen and Woolley (2001)), leads to outcomes that are generally Pareto-dominated. The analytic attractiveness of noncooperative equilibrium models lies in the fact that equilibria are often unique, an especially distinct advantage when formulating an econometric model.

A large number of empirical studies have tested whether observed household behavior is more consistent with a single household utility function or with a model that posits strategic interactions between household members. These studies have led to a decisive rejection of the "unitary" model. Unfortunately, there have been few empirical studies to date that have attempted to actually estimate a collective model of household labor supply (some notable exceptions include Kapteyn and Kooreman (1992), Browning et al. (1994), Fortin and Lacroix (1997), and Blundell et al. (2005)). Two of the more important reasons for the paucity of empirical studies are the stringent data requirements for estimation of such a model and lack of agreement regarding the "refinement" to utilize when selecting a unique equilibrium when a multiplicity exist (as is the case in virtually all cooperative

¹While Heckman's model was based on an explicit model of utility maximization, it did assume that the labor supply decision of the husband was predetermined.

models).

Some researchers have advocated using the assumption of Pareto efficiency in nonunitary models as an identification device (see, e.g., Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992) and Flinn (2000)).² Our view in this paper is slightly more eclectic. We view household time allocation decisions as either being associated with a particular utility outcome on the Pareto frontier, or to be associated with the noncooperative (static Nash) equilibrium point. In reality there are a continuum of points that dominate the noncooperative equilibrium point and that do not lie on the Pareto frontier, however developing an estimable model that allows such outcomes to enter the choice set of the household seems beyond our means. Our paper expands the equilibrium choice set to two focal points, but it still represents a very restrictive view of the world.

Even under an assumption of efficiency there is wide latitude in modeling the mechanism by which a specific efficient outcome is implemented, as is evidenced by the lively debate between advocates of the use of Nash bargaining or other axiomatic systems (e.g., McElroy and Horney (1981,1990), McElroy (1990)) and those advocating a more data driven approach (e.g., Chiappori (1988)). The use of an axiomatic system such as Nash bargaining requires that one first specify a “disagreement outcome” with respect to which each party’s surplus can be explicitly defined. It has long been appreciated that the bargaining outcome can depend critically on the specification of this threat point. Most often (in the household economics literature) the threat point has been assumed to represent the value to each agent of living independently from the other. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) provide an illuminating discussion of the consequences of alternative specifications of the threat point on the analysis of household decision-making. In particular, instead of assuming the value of the divorce state as the disagreement point for each partner, they consider this point to be determined by the value of the marriage to each given some default mode of behavior, which they call “separate spheres.” In this state, each party takes decisions and generally acts in a manner in accordance with “customary” gender roles. Lundberg and Pollak state that households will choose to behave in this customary way when the “transactions costs” they face are too high.

The approach taken in this paper is something of a synthesis of the standard bargaining and sharing rule approaches to modeling household behavior. We introduce outside options that household members must recognize and meet, if possible, when choosing efficient allocations. These side conditions on the household’s optimization problem are interpretable more as participation constraints than “threat points,” and these options do not serve as a basis for conducting bargaining in the axiomatic Nash sense. Practically speaking, we view the household allocation decisions as emanating from maximization of the sum of the

²An argument sometimes given for this assumption relies on the Folk Theorem. As household members interact frequently and can observe many of each other’s constraint sets and actions, for reasonable values of a discount factor efficient behavior should be attainable. The most general behavioral specification estimated here allows us to examine this claim empirically, and we find that efficient allocations cannot be sustained for a small percentage of households.

utilities of the two spouses where the Pareto weight associated with the utility of spouse 1 is α . Adding side constraints to the household optimization problem restricts the set of α -generated time allocations that are implementable, and, depending on the nature of the constraints, may make it impossible to implement any efficient solution.

In this paper we develop and estimate a model of household labor supply which allows for both efficient and inefficient intrahousehold behavior.³ Gains from marriage are taken to arise from the presence of a publicly-consumed good K that is produced in the household with time inputs from the spouses and goods purchased in the market. Since the data we use in estimating the model contain no direct consumption information, we consider leisure to be the only private good assignable to each spouse. Given a pair of fixed wage offers, w_1 and w_2 , a pair of nonlabor income flows, Y_1 and Y_2 , and a fixed time constraint of T for each spouse, the time allocations $(h_1, \tau_1, h_2, \tau_2)$, where h_i and τ_i are the time spent in market work and house work by spouse i , are chosen in either an inefficient (Nash equilibrium) or efficient ("constrained" Pareto optimal) manner. Under our model specification, in an *ex ante* sense, each household has a positive probability of behaving in either manner.

In the presence of a public good, efficient outcomes, which by definition lie on the Pareto frontier, must weakly dominate the value of the noncooperative equilibrium for each spouse. So why would some households fail to determine time allocations in an efficient manner? There are many ways to look at this issue, such as through an assumption that efficiency involves costs of coordination and implementation over and above what is required when behavior is determined in Nash equilibrium, which may involve monitoring, increased communication, etc. This is a reasonable approach to take,⁴ but we focus more directly on implementation issues in this paper. We look at the case in which household interactions are repeated over an indefinitely long horizon, and determine whether cooperative behavior can be supported using Folk Theorem-inspired arguments.

We build four distinct models of household behavior that are taken to the household time allocation data. They are not strictly nested for the most part, but do have a reasonably natural ordering in terms of complexity. They are:

1. (Nash Equilibrium, or *NE*) Let $(h_i^*, \tau_i^*)(h_{i'}, \tau_{i'})$ denote the best response functions of spouse i given that spouse i' chooses employment hours $h_{i'}$ and housework time $\tau_{i'}$. Then the Nash equilibrium time allocations for the household are $(\hat{h}_1^N, \hat{\tau}_1^N, \hat{h}_2^N, \hat{\tau}_2^N)$,

³Lugo-Gil (2003) contains an analysis of a model based on a somewhat similar idea. In her case, spouses decide on consumption allocations in a cooperative manner after the outside option is optimally chosen. All "intact" households chose a threat point either of divorce or noncooperative behavior. The choice of threat point has an impact on intrahousehold allocations. In her case, all household allocations are determined efficiently (using a Nash bargaining framework), whereas in ours, some allocations are determined in an inefficient manner. Moreover, her empirical focus was on expenditure decisions, while we focus on time allocations.

⁴In fact, this is exactly the approach we took in earlier versions of this paper. While we believe that coordination and monitoring costs are "real," we believe that the implementation story we build here, based on Folk theorem arguments, is slightly more compelling.

where $\hat{h}_1^N = h_1^*(\hat{h}_2^N, \hat{\tau}_2^N)$, $\hat{\tau}_1^N = \tau_1^*(\hat{h}_2^N, \hat{\tau}_2^N)$, $\hat{h}_2^N = h_2^*(\hat{h}_1^N, \hat{\tau}_1^N)$, and $\hat{\tau}_2^N = \tau_2^*(\hat{h}_1^N, \hat{\tau}_1^N)$. As is well-known, there are alternative time allocation decisions that can yield higher utility to each spouse. The Nash equilibrium allocation, is a natural focal point for our analysis since (a) it is unique under our assumptions regarding functional forms of preferences and household technology and (b) presents no opportunity for profitable deviation from their Nash equilibrium time allocation decisions for either spouse. These attributes are not shared by the efficient time allocation decisions which follow.

2. (Pareto Optimal, or *PO*) All efficient household time allocations can be generated by maximizing

$$(\hat{h}_1^P, \hat{\tau}_1^P, \hat{h}_2^P, \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\alpha) = \arg \max_{(h_1, \tau_1, h_2, \tau_2)} \alpha u_1(l_1, K) + (1 - \alpha) u_2(l_2, K), \quad \alpha \in (0, 1), \quad (1)$$

subject to the usual budget and time constraints and the household production technology. All of these allocations produce utility outcomes that lie on the Pareto frontier, and thus have the desirable property that one spouse's utility cannot be increased without decreasing the utility of the other spouse. From our perspective, these efficient outcomes have some problematic features as well. First, there are a continuum of efficient outcomes. Only by settling on a value of the Pareto weight α do we obtain a unique solution to the household's time allocation problem. Second, these outcomes may not be particularly compelling if one spouse does appreciably worse relative to their payoffs from behaving in other, "reasonable" ways. Third, the allocations are not, in general, best responses of either spouse to the time choices of the other. Consequently, there is a problem connected with the implementation of these time allotments.

3. (Constrained Pareto Optimal, or *CPO*) In this case, we restrict outcomes on the Pareto frontier to at least yield as much utility to each spouse as he or she would realize in the static Nash equilibrium of the static game. This essentially restricts the welfare weight α utilized in the social welfare function (1) to a connected subinterval of $(0, 1)$. We use the Nash equilibrium payoff values in the participation constraint, since this form of behavior is both uniquely determined and behaviorally consistent (in the sense that no spouse has an incentive to deviate from the Nash time allocations). Given the state variables characterizing the household, we can determine the Nash equilibrium payoffs to the spouses, which are given by $\{V_1^N, V_2^N\}$. Associated with each solution to (1) is a pair of payoffs to the spouses $\{V_1^P(\alpha), V_2^P(\alpha)\}$, and, as we will show, V_1^P is strictly increasing in α and V_2^P is strictly decreasing in α . There will exist an interval $I^C(V_1^N, V_2^N) \equiv [\underline{\alpha}(V_1^N), \bar{\alpha}(V_2^N)] \subset (0, 1)$, and any $\alpha \in I^C$ will be associated with efficient time allocation decisions in which each spouse obtains a payoff at least as large as what they would receive in Nash equilibrium. The

determination of household time allocations in this case, conditional on a value of α , is as follows. If $\alpha \in I^C$, then

$$(\hat{h}_1^C, \hat{\tau}_1^C, \hat{h}_2^C, \hat{\tau}_2^C)(\alpha) = (\hat{h}_1^P, \hat{\tau}_1^P, \hat{h}_2^P, \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\alpha), \quad \alpha \in I^C, \quad (2)$$

since the “participation constraint” is not binding. If $\alpha < \underline{\alpha}(V_1^N)$, so that spouse 1 would have a higher payoff in Nash equilibrium, the α must be “adjusted” up so that he has the same welfare in either regime. In this case,

$$(\hat{h}_1^C, \hat{\tau}_1^C, \hat{h}_2^C, \hat{\tau}_2^C)(\alpha) = (\hat{h}_1^P, \hat{\tau}_1^P, \hat{h}_2^P, \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\underline{\alpha}(V_1^N)), \quad \alpha < \underline{\alpha}(V_1^N). \quad (3)$$

Conversely, if spouse 2 suffers utility-wise in the efficient outcome associated with α , the α must be adjusted downward, and we have

$$(\hat{h}_1^C, \hat{\tau}_1^C, \hat{h}_2^C, \hat{\tau}_2^C)(\alpha) = (\hat{h}_1^P, \hat{\tau}_1^P, \hat{h}_2^P, \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\bar{\alpha}(V_2^N)), \quad \alpha > \bar{\alpha}(V_2^N). \quad (4)$$

Note that under this behavioral rule, there is still, in general, a continuum of possible solutions, associated with all values of α belonging to I^C .

4. (Endogenous Interaction, or *EI*). The final behavioral set up we consider, which nests the NE and CPO specifications in a particular sense, allows households to choose allocations either on the Pareto frontier or those associated with the Nash equilibrium. In this case, we consider household decision-making in a stylized dynamic context, in which the spouses face the same constraints each period and must decide whether to supply time allocations consistent with a given α on the Pareto frontier or to choose the Nash equilibrium allocations. We use a grim trigger strategy set up with a restricted strategy space to model the choice, in which each spouse calculates their payoffs from deviating from the allocation $(\hat{h}_i^C, \hat{\tau}_i^C)(\alpha)$ given that their spouse “complies” with their time commitments, $(\hat{h}_{i'}^C, \hat{\tau}_{i'}^C)(\alpha)$. If either spouse deviates from the efficient allocation in any period, then the household time allocations are determined according to the Nash equilibrium inefficient allocation forever after. The long-run costs of cheating are an increasing function of the discount factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$ which we assume to be common to both spouses. We show that there exists a critical value of β , β^{**} , such that for any β less than β^* the household allocations will be inefficient. For any $\beta \geq \beta^*$, the household will behave efficiently. The implementation constraint further restricts the set of α that can be used to determine the efficient outcomes. In particular, for any $\beta \geq \beta^{**}$, there exists an “implementable” set of α , $I^E(\beta, V_1^N, V_2^N)$ characterized in terms of lower and upper limits $\underline{\alpha}(V_1^N, \beta)$ and $\bar{\alpha}(V_2^N, \beta)$, which has the property

$$I^E(\beta, V_1^N, V_2^N) \subseteq I^C(V_1^N, V_2^N).$$

When $\beta < \beta^{**}$, then $I^E = \emptyset$. Then we have

$$(\hat{h}_1^E, \hat{\tau}_1^E, \hat{h}_2^E, \hat{\tau}_2^E)(\alpha, \beta) = \begin{cases} (\hat{h}_1^N, \hat{\tau}_1^N, \hat{h}_2^N, \hat{\tau}_2^N) & \text{if } \beta < \beta^{**} \\ (\hat{h}_1^P, \hat{\tau}_1^P, \hat{h}_2^P, \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\underline{\alpha}(V_1^N, \beta)) & \text{if } \beta \geq \beta^{**}, \alpha < \underline{\alpha}(V_1^N, \beta) \\ (\hat{h}_1^P, \hat{\tau}_1^P, \hat{h}_2^P, \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\alpha) & \text{if } \beta \geq \beta^{**}, \alpha \in I^F(\beta, V_1^N, V_2^N) \\ (\hat{h}_1^P, \hat{\tau}_1^P, \hat{h}_2^P, \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\bar{\alpha}(V_2^N, \beta)) & \text{if } \beta \geq \beta^{**}, \alpha > \bar{\alpha}(V_2^N, \beta) \end{cases}$$

The details behind this summary of results will be presented in the following section; our intention is simply to give the reader an idea of the linkages between the models we develop and estimate below.

We view the contribution of the paper as bringing short and long-run implementation issues into the estimation of models of household behavior. Basic versions of the first and second models described above, those of inefficient Nash equilibrium and the “collective” model, have been estimated on numerous occasions, so there is nothing new in our estimation of these models. However, estimation of the collective model subject to the constraint that no spouses welfare level be less than what they can obtain under the Nash equilibrium has not been performed.⁵ We demonstrate empirically that adding such a constraint has significant effects on the point estimates of the model and, consequently, on the welfare inferences that can be drawn.

The addition of the incentive compatibility constraint in our final model specification is noteworthy in that it allows spouses the choice of their mode of interaction. Some households, given their state variables, will choose to behave in an inefficient manner, while others will behave in a “constrained” efficient manner. This carries the important implication that small changes in state variables, such as wages or nonlabor income, may have large changes on time allocations if these small changes prompt a change in behavioral regime.

While we have added two sets of constraints to the household optimization problem, it is obviously the case that other types of constraints could be added instead of, or in

⁵Mazzocco (2007) is a valuable contribution to the literature that also considers implementation issues explicitly. The focus of his analysis is on determining whether intertemporal household allocations are consistent with *ex ante* efficient allocations, or whether welfare weights have to be continually adjusted to meet short-run participation issues that arise when household members cannot credibly make life-long commitments to a given *ex ante* efficient allocation. He finds evidence supporting the lack of commitment hypothesis.

There are a number of differences between his approach and the one taken here, the most salient of which are the following. First, the dynamic setting he considers is not nearly as stylized as the one employed here. Second, participation constraints change over the life cycle, though they are modeled as exogenous random processes, whereas in our case the outside option is explicitly modeled. Third, in his model all households behave efficiently in every period, that is, the outside option is never chosen. In our case, the outside option of inefficient behavior is chosen in some states of the world.

Another valuable paper that examines commitment issues in a household setting using a dynamic contracting approach is Ligon (2002). As in Mazzocco (2007), all final household allocation decisions are constrained efficient, which is not the case in our EI specification.

addition to, the two we have analyzed. For example, it is common to specify the value of each spouse in the divorce state as the disagreement point when using a Nash bargaining framework to analyze household decisions. Clearly, this constraint could be added to those considered here when determining the set of implementable values of the Pareto weight α . These types of generalizations are left to future research, and are probably best considered in a truly dynamic model of the household that allows for divorce outcomes.

The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the theoretical structure of the model. Section 3 contains a discussion of estimation issues and develops the non-parametric and parametric estimators used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 contains a description of the data and model estimates. Section 5 concludes.

2 The Household's Decision Problem

In the first part of this section we describe the objectives and constraints facing the spouses. We then turn to a consideration of the manner in which a household equilibrium allocation is determined.

2.1 Preferences and Constraints

We assume that the household produces a public good using time inputs of the spouses and a single composite good purchased in the market at a price normalized to one. The production function is Cobb-Douglas, with

$$K = \tau_1^{\delta_1} \tau_2^{\delta_2} M^{1-\delta_1-\delta_2},$$

where M is total household income, τ_i is the time supplied by spouse i in household production, and $\delta_1 \geq 0$, $\delta_2 \geq 0$, and $\delta_1 + \delta_2 \leq 1$. Thus the household production technology exhibits constant returns to scale.

Individuals supply time in a competitive market to generate earnings. The wage rate of spouse i is w_i , and the time they spend in market activities is h_i . The nonlabor income of the household is denoted by Y , and is the sum of the nonlabor incomes of the spouses, $Y_1 + Y_2$, plus any nonattributable nonlabor income that accrues to the household, \tilde{Y} . The sources of nonlabor income will play no role in our analysis. Total income of the household is then $M = w_1 h_1 + w_2 h_2 + Y$.

Each spouse has Cobb-Douglas preferences over a private good, leisure, and the household public good, so that

$$u_i = \lambda_i \ln(l_i) + (1 - \lambda_i) \ln K, \quad i = 1, 2,$$

where l_i is the leisure consumed by spouse i , and $\lambda_i \in [0, 1]$, $i = 1, 2$, is the Cobb-Douglas preference parameter. Each spouse has a time endowment of T , so that

$$T = h_i + \tau_i + l_i, \quad i = 1, 2,$$

defines the time constraint. Spouse i controls his or her time allocations regarding h_i and τ_i (which determine l_i , of course).

The actual time allocation decisions in the household will depend on the state variables that characterize the household and the mode of behavior assumed. Under behavioral specification *NE*, household time allocations are determined (uniquely) within a static Nash equilibrium. The utility levels associated with the household time allocations lies strictly inside the Pareto frontier. Under behavioral specifications *PO* and *CPO*, given a welfare weight α , time allocations are uniquely determined and are associated with utility pairs that lie on the Pareto frontier. Finally, under behavioral specification *EI*, time allocations are either determined in Nash equilibrium, as in *NE*, or are determined as in *CPO*, but with an additional constraint on the values of α that are implementable. The utility pairs associated with the *EI* either lie on the Pareto frontier or are strictly inside of it. We now examine each of these cases in detail.

2.2 Time Allocation Decisions

2.2.1 Nash Equilibrium

Given our functional form assumptions, it is straightforward to derive the two equation system of reaction functions for each spouse. If we let the $a_i = (h_i \tau_i)$ denote the actions of spouse i , then we can define the reaction function of spouse 1 given the actions of spouse 2 as

$$a_1^*(a_2) = \arg \max_{a_1} u_1(a_1, a_2)$$

where the maximization should be understood as being conditional on the constraint set facing the household. In the same manner, we can define the reaction function of spouse 2 given the actions of spouse 1, $a_2^*(a_1)$. The choice of functional forms allows us to obtain a unique Nash equilibrium for this problem,

$$\begin{aligned} a_1^N &= a_1^*(a_2^N) \\ a_2^N &= a_2^*(a_1^N), \end{aligned}$$

with the Nash equilibrium payoff to spouse i given by $V_i^N \equiv u_i(a_1^N, a_2^N)$. In the Nash equilibrium, or indeed, even in some efficient equilibria, one or both spouses may not spend time in the labor market. This basically results from their earnings being perfect substitutes for one another, and also with nonlabor income, Y . However, through our specification of the production technology, any equilibrium outcome must have both individuals supplying time to household production. The data used in the estimation exercise reported below are broadly consistent with the implication that neither spouse is at a corner with respect to this time allocation decision.

2.2.2 Pareto Optimal Decisions with No Side Constraints

As in the introduction, we write the Benthamite social welfare function for the household as

$$\begin{aligned} W_\alpha(l_1, l_2, K) &= \alpha u_1(l_1, K) + (1 - \alpha) u_2(l_2, K) \\ &= \alpha \lambda_1 \ln(l_1) + (1 - \alpha) \lambda_2 \ln(l_2) + (\alpha(1 - \lambda_1) + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \lambda_2)) \ln(K) \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

We immediately note that we can write this as

$$W_\alpha(l_1, l_2, K) = \tilde{\lambda}_1(\alpha) \ln l_1 + \tilde{\lambda}_2(\alpha) \ln l_2 + (1 - \tilde{\lambda}_1(\alpha) - \tilde{\lambda}_2(\alpha)) \ln K,$$

where $\tilde{\lambda}_1(\alpha) = \alpha \lambda_1$ and $\tilde{\lambda}_2(\alpha) = (1 - \alpha) \lambda_2$. Substituting in the production function for K , we have

$$\begin{aligned} W_\alpha(l_1, l_2, \tau_1, \tau_2) &= \tilde{\lambda}_1(\alpha) \ln(l_1) + \tilde{\lambda}_2(\alpha) \ln l_2 \\ &\quad + (1 - \tilde{\lambda}_1(\alpha) - \tilde{\lambda}_2(\alpha)) (\delta_1 \ln \tau_1 + \delta_2 \ln \tau_2 + (1 - \delta_1 - \delta_2) \ln(w_1 h_1 + w_2 h_2 + Y)), \end{aligned}$$

or

$$\begin{aligned} W_\alpha(h_1, \tau_1, h_2, \tau_2) &= \tilde{\lambda}_1(\alpha) \ln(T - h_1 - \tau_1) + \tilde{\lambda}_2(\alpha) \ln(T - h_2 - \tau_2) + \varphi_1(\alpha) \ln \tau_1 + \varphi_2(\alpha) \ln(\tau_2) \\ &\quad + (1 - \tilde{\lambda}_1(\alpha) - \tilde{\lambda}_2(\alpha) - \varphi_1(\alpha) - \varphi_2(\alpha)) \ln(w_1 h_1 + w_2 h_2 + Y), \end{aligned}$$

where $\varphi_1(\alpha) = (1 - \tilde{\lambda}_1(\alpha) - \tilde{\lambda}_2(\alpha)) \delta_1$ and $\varphi_2(\alpha) = (1 - \tilde{\lambda}_1(\alpha) - \tilde{\lambda}_2(\alpha)) \delta_2$. Given a value of α , the optimal time allocations are given by

$$(\hat{h}_1^P, \hat{\tau}_1^P, \hat{h}_2^P, \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\alpha) = \arg \max_{\substack{(h_1, \tau_1, h_2, \tau_2) \\ h_1 \geq 0, h_2 \geq 0}} W_\alpha(h_1, \tau_1, h_2, \tau_2).$$

For a given value of α , the four parameters $(\tilde{\lambda}_1, \tilde{\lambda}_2, \varphi_1, \varphi_2)$, in conjunction with the three state variables (w_1, w_2, Y) , determine a unique vector of time allocations, which are associated with utility pairs that lie on the Pareto frontier.

2.2.3 Constrained Pareto Outcomes

As was pointed out in the Introduction, Pareto efficient outcomes have the desirable feature that one spouse's utility cannot be improved without decreasing the other's, but may or may not meet certain "fairness" criteria. For example, Nash bargaining outcomes are efficient, and are restricted to the set of utility pairs such that each spouse is at least as well-off as they would be under disagreement. If we consider the disagreement payoffs of each spouse to be equal to their payoffs under static Nash equilibrium play, then the Nash bargaining solution is given by

$$(a_1^{NB}, a_2^{NB}) = \arg \max_{a_1, a_2} (u_1(a_1, a_2) - V_1^N)^{\tilde{\alpha}} (u_2(a_1, a_2) - V_2^N)^{1 - \tilde{\alpha}}, \quad (6)$$

with $\tilde{\alpha} \in [0, 1]$, where $\tilde{\alpha}$ is referred to as the Nash bargaining power parameter. By varying $\tilde{\alpha}$ over the unit interval we trace out that portion of the Pareto frontier that lies to the “northeast” of the Nash equilibrium utility pair. For $\tilde{\alpha} = 0$, spouse 1 obtains a utility payoff equal to V_1^N , and when $\tilde{\alpha} = 1$, spouse 2 receives a payoff equal to V_2^N .

Our constrained Pareto efficient problem limits utility pairs to the same set of values as those associated with the Nash bargaining solution in (6), and associated with each of these pairs is the same set of spousal time allocations. The values of α that produce utility outcomes that weakly dominate the Nash equilibrium utility values are determined as follows.

Proposition 1 *There exists an interval $I^C(V_1^N, V_2^N) \equiv [\underline{\alpha}(V_1^N), \bar{\alpha}(V_2^N)] \subset (0, 1)$, $\underline{\alpha}(V_1^N) < \bar{\alpha}(V_2^N)$, such that*

$$\begin{aligned} u_1((\hat{h}_1^P \hat{\tau}_1^P)(\alpha), (\hat{h}_2^P \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\alpha)) &\geq V_1^N \\ u_2((\hat{h}_1^P \hat{\tau}_1^P)(\alpha), (\hat{h}_2^P \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\alpha)) &\geq V_2^N \end{aligned}$$

if and only if $\alpha \in I^C(V_1^N, V_2^N)$.

Proof. Given our functional form assumptions on preferences and technology, along the Pareto frontier $du_1((\hat{h}_1^P \hat{\tau}_1^P)(\alpha), (\hat{h}_2^P \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\alpha))/d\alpha > 0$ and $du_2((\hat{h}_1^P \hat{\tau}_1^P)(\alpha), (\hat{h}_2^P \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\alpha))/d\alpha < 0$. Furthermore, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 0} u_1((\hat{h}_1^P \hat{\tau}_1^P)(\alpha), (\hat{h}_2^P \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\alpha)) &= -\infty \\ \lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 1} u_1((\hat{h}_1^P \hat{\tau}_1^P)(\alpha), (\hat{h}_2^P \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\alpha)) &\equiv \bar{u}_1 \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 0} u_2((\hat{h}_1^P \hat{\tau}_1^P)(\alpha), (\hat{h}_2^P \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\alpha)) &\equiv \bar{u}_2 \\ \lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 1} u_2((\hat{h}_1^P \hat{\tau}_1^P)(\alpha), (\hat{h}_2^P \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\alpha)) &= -\infty, \end{aligned}$$

where $\lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 0} u_1^P(\alpha) = -\infty$ is due to $\lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 0} l_1 = 0$ and $\lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 1} u_2^P(\alpha) = -\infty$ is due to $\lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 1} l_2 = 0$. Since $\lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 1} \hat{h}_2^P(\alpha) \geq \hat{h}_2^N$ and $\lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 1} \hat{\tau}_2^P(\alpha) > \hat{\tau}_2^N$, $\bar{u}_1 \geq u_1(a_1^N, (\lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 1} \hat{h}_2^P(\alpha), \lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 1} \hat{\tau}_2^P(\alpha))) > V_1^N$, and $\bar{u}_2 \geq u_2((\lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 0} \hat{h}_2^P(\alpha), \lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 0} \hat{\tau}_2^P(\alpha), a_2^N)) > V_2^N$. Then u_1^P is a strictly increasing function of α on the interval $(0, 1)$, and u_2^P is a strictly decreasing function of α on $(0, 1)$. Given the limits of u_1^P and u_2^P , there exists a unique value $\underline{\alpha}(V_1^N)$ such that $u_1((\hat{h}_1^P \hat{\tau}_1^P)(\underline{\alpha}(V_1^N)), (\hat{h}_2^P \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\underline{\alpha}(V_1^N))) = V_1^N$ and a unique value $\bar{\alpha}(V_2^N)$ such that $u_2((\hat{h}_1^P \hat{\tau}_1^P)(\bar{\alpha}(V_2^N)), (\hat{h}_2^P \hat{\tau}_2^P)(\bar{\alpha}(V_2^N))) = V_2^N$. Since along the Pareto frontier, $u_2^P(\underline{\alpha}(V_1^N)) > V_2^N = u_2^P(\bar{\alpha}(V_2^N))$, and since u_2^P is a strictly decreasing function of α , $\underline{\alpha}(V_1^N) < \bar{\alpha}(V_2^N)$. ■

The only difference between the descriptions of the relevant portion of the Pareto frontier under Nash bargaining and the Pareto weight formulation is what is essentially a

normalization of “permissible” α values. Under Nash bargaining, $\tilde{\alpha} \in [0, 1]$, whereas under the social welfare function formulation, $\alpha \in [\underline{\alpha}(V_1^N), \bar{\alpha}(V_2^N)]$. In neither setup, axiomatic Nash bargaining or the social welfare function, is there an explicit motivation given for the value of $\tilde{\alpha}$ or α chosen.

Given problems associated with the identification of the welfare weight α , which are discussed in detail below, we will typically assume that there exists one value of α , common to all marriages, which could be culturally determined. The constrained Pareto optimal allocation is determined by first determining whether $\alpha \in I^C(V_1^N, V_2^N)$. If so, each spouses’ utility level using the Pareto weight of α exceeds their static Nash equilibrium utility level, and the constraint is not binding. Instead, if $\alpha < \underline{\alpha}(V_1^N)$, the Pareto efficient solution yields less utility to spouse 1 than the Nash equilibrium solution. To get this spouse to participate in the Pareto efficient solution, it is necessary to provide them with at least as much utility as they would obtain in the static Nash equilibrium, which means adjusting the Pareto weight up to the value $\underline{\alpha}(V_1^N)$. Conversely, if $\alpha > \bar{\alpha}(V_2^N)$, then the Pareto weight has to be adjusted downward to $\bar{\alpha}(V_2^N)$ to provide the incentive for the second spouse to participate in the household efficient outcome. The resulting time allocations are given formally in (2) through (4).

2.2.4 Endogenous Interaction

The time allocations in the Pareto optimal and constrained Pareto optimal cases may or may not satisfy another set of constraints, one that involves implementation. The essential issue is that utility levels that lie along the Pareto frontier are not associated with time allocation choices by either spouse that are “best responses” (in the static sense) to the choices of their partner. As we know, only the static Nash equilibrium has that property, and is associated with utility outcomes that are weakly dominated by those associated with the constrained Pareto optimal choices we have just discussed.

Why might spouses cheat on an efficient agreement that improves the welfare of both with respect to the Nash equilibrium outcome? The temptation to cheat in this case may arise from purely self-interested behavior, as it does when we study the incentives of firms engaged in collusive behavior to deviate from their assigned production quotas (e.g., Green and Porter, 1984). In that case, the welfare of firms is linked through a common market for outputs or inputs, though firms’ objectives are typically taken to be solely the maximization of their own monetary profits. In the case of households, the objectives of spouses, may be considerably more complex than those of firms, and may include altruism. However, the existence of caring preferences, in and of itself, does not make implementation of an efficient allocation a foregone conclusion. Indeed, spouses may care so much about each other that an efficient solution may involve each behaving in what would appear to be a more self-interested manner to an observer. In this case, “cheating” on the efficient outcome may imply a spouse spends more of their resources on goods of direct value only to the other spouse. In the household context cheating may be prevalent, but due to the

presence of household production technologies and interconnected preferences, it is difficult to detect without strong assumptions on preferences on technologies.

As is well-known from Folk theorem results, in order to implement equilibrium outcomes that are not best responses in a static sense, it is necessary to provide an intertemporal context to household choices. Accordingly we define the welfare of each spouse to be

$$J_i = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} u_i(a_1(t), a_2(t)),$$

where β is a discount factor taking values in the unit interval, and $a_j(t)$ are the actions chosen by spouse j in period t . For reasons related to data availability and computational feasibility, we restrict our attention to the case in which the stage game played by the spouses has the same structure in every period. That is, preferences and technology parameters are fixed over time, as well as wage offers and nonlabor income levels.

We assume that the couple utilize a *grim trigger strategy*, with the punishment phase being perpetual Nash equilibrium play.⁶ We assume that the allocation is determined by

$$a_i(t) = \begin{cases} a_i^E(\alpha) & \text{if } a_{i'}(s) = a_{i'}^E(\alpha), s = 1, \dots, t-1 \\ a_i^N & \text{if } a_{i'}(s) \neq a_{i'}^E(\alpha) \text{ for any } s = 1, \dots, t-1 \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

in the equilibrium. In this case, a divergence by either spouse from their prescribed action $a_i^E(\alpha)$ leads to the play of Nash equilibrium in all subsequent periods. $a_i^E(\alpha)$ denotes the prescribed efficient allocation, which is determined using the Pareto weight α .

To determine whether there exists an implementable cooperative equilibrium in the household, we must check whether there is sufficient patience among the spouses to sustain the cooperative outcome given the size of the penalty they face for deviation. Each spouse's objective is to maximize the present discounted value of their sequence of payoffs given the state variables characterizing the household and the history of past actions of the spouses. To determine whether or not cooperation is an equilibrium outcome, define the value of spouse 1 cheating on the cooperative agreement given that spouse 2 does not by

$$V_1^R(\alpha) + \beta \frac{V_1^N}{1 - \beta}, \quad (8)$$

where

$$V_1^R(\alpha) = \max_{a_1} u_1(a_1, a_2^E(\alpha)),$$

and where the second term on the right hand side of (8) is the discount rate multiplied by the present value of the noncooperative equilibrium, which is the outcome of a deviation

⁶We are aware that there are more 'efficient' punishment strategies available to the household members, but the incorporation of these punishments into the econometric model is a difficult task. The important point for the analysis is that given our modeling set up, a measurable subset of the state vector space will result in a lack of implementability of efficient outcomes, the main point of our analysis.

from $a_1^E(\alpha)$ under (7). If the spouse chooses to implement the cooperative outcome (and it is assumed that spouse 2 chooses $a_2^P(\alpha)$), then the payoff from this action is

$$\frac{V_1^E(\alpha)}{1-\beta}.$$

Spouse 1 is indifferent between renegeing and implementing the cooperative equilibrium when

$$\frac{V_1^E(\alpha)}{1-\beta} = V_1^R(\alpha) + \beta \frac{V_1^N}{1-\beta}.$$

The discount factor β is not a determinant of stage game payoffs, so we can look for a critical value of the discount factor at which the equality (??) holds. This critical value is given by

$$\beta_1^*(\alpha) = \frac{V_1^R(\alpha) - V_1^E(\alpha)}{V_1^R(\alpha) - V_1^N}.$$

Note that if $V_1^E(\alpha) > V_1^N(\alpha)$, then $V_1^R(\alpha) > V_1^E(\alpha)$, and $V_1^R(\alpha) - V_1^E(\alpha) < V_1^R(\alpha) - V_1^N$, so that $\beta_1^*(\alpha) \in (0, 1)$. Clearly, an exactly symmetric analysis can be used to determine a critical discount factor for the spouse 2, $\beta_2^*(\alpha)$. This leads us to the following result.

Proposition 2 *Under a grim trigger strategy and given constrained Pareto optimal actions $(a_1^E, a_2^E)(\alpha)$, the household implements the efficient outcome if and only if $\beta \geq \max\{\beta_1^*(\alpha), \beta_2^*(\alpha)\}$, where β is the common household discount factor and α is the given Pareto weight.*

Proof. Under complete information, the values $(\beta_1^*(\alpha), \beta_2^*(\alpha))$ are known to both spouses. If $\beta \geq \beta_i^*(\alpha)$ for $i = 1, 2$, each agent knows that the value of implementing the cooperative solution forever dominates the value of renegeing for each, so playing cooperative in each period is a best response for each spouse and constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Say that $\beta_1^*(\alpha) \leq \beta$ but $\beta_2^*(\alpha) > \beta$. The value of spouse 1 choosing $a_1^E(\alpha)$ will be

$$u_1(a_1^E(\alpha), a_2^R(\alpha)) + \beta \frac{V_1^N}{1-\beta}$$

under the grim trigger strategy, since $a_2^R(\alpha) \neq a_2^E(\alpha)$ triggers the punishment phase. Given the renegeing action $a_2^R(\alpha)$, $a_1^E(\alpha)$ will not maximize this payoff, and spouse 1 will best respond $a_1^*(a_2^R(\alpha))$, to which spouse 2, will best respond, with the actions converging to those of the (unique) Nash equilibrium (a_1^N, a_2^N) . Thus both spouses will play the Nash equilibrium at every point in time. For the same reason, when $\beta < \beta_1^*(\alpha)$ and $\beta < \beta_2^*(\alpha)$, the sequence of best responses to the renegeing behavior of the other spouse leads to the Nash equilibrium being played in each period. ■

We now turn to the consideration of the determination of the actions $(a_1^E(\alpha), a_2^E(\alpha))$ in the Endogenous Interactions case. After determining the efficient allocation of the

household under CPO given an initial notional value of α , we can determine if this solution is *implementable*. For simplicity, let α_{CPO} denote the *ex post* value of α that satisfies the participation constraint for a household (characterized by a state vector S) under the CPO specification. If $\beta \geq \beta_1^*(\alpha_{CPO})$ and $\beta \geq \beta_2^*(\alpha_{CPO})$, then the CPO outcome is implementable, and the actions in the Endogenous Interactions case are the same as are specified under CPO.

In general, the *ex post* Pareto weight associated with the CPO regime is not implementable under the EI regime. This is clearly the case when α_{CPO} is determined in such a way that the participation constraint is binding for one of the spouses, which is always the case whenever $\alpha_{CPO} \neq \alpha_0$. In this case, there will be no long run welfare gains for the spouse with the binding participation constraint, and his or her best response will be to cheat on the efficient outcome. In such a case, to induce that spouse not to deviate from the efficient outcome, the Pareto weight associated with that spouse must be increased. If there is an implementable efficient outcome, for a given value of β , it will be the one for which the “long run” participation (i.e., no cheating) constraint is exactly satisfied. For a given value of β , there may be no value of the Pareto weight that simultaneously satisfies the “no cheating” constraint for both spouses, and in this case, no efficient allocation is attainable. The formal definition of implementability is the following:

Definition 3 *A household has an implementable outcome on the Pareto frontier if there exists an $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ such that $\beta \geq \max\{\beta_1^*(\alpha), \beta_2^*(\alpha)\}$.*

Figure 1 contains the graph of the β_i^* , $i = 1, 2$, for a given set of state variables that fully characterize spousal preferences, household technology, and choice sets. We note that β_1^* is a decreasing function of α , since increasing (static) gains associated with the efficient allocation (as α increases) requires lower levels of patience to sustain implementation on the part of spouse 1. Obviously, β_2^* is increasing in α for the opposite reason. We see that for this set of state variables, the household has an implementable efficient outcome if the common discount factor of the spouses exceeds β^{**} . If the discount factor is less than that, no outcome on the Pareto frontier can be implemented, even though there are a continuum of allocations with static payoffs that strictly exceed the static Nash equilibrium payoffs.

In Figure 1 we have also indicated the manner in which the *ex post* Pareto bargaining weight is determined when an implementable allocation exists. Since the value of the discount factor, β , exceeds β^{**} , and an implementable solution exists. Starting from the *ex post* α associated with the static Nash equilibrium participation constraint, α_{CPO} , we see that at this value $\beta_1^*(\alpha_{CPO}) > \beta$ and $\beta_2^*(\alpha_{CPO}) < \beta$, so that at this low level of α spouse 1 would cheat on the efficient allocation, while spouse 2 would not, meaning that in equilibrium the α_{CPO} -generated allocation could not be implemented. In this case, α is increased until it reaches the value α_{EI} , which is that value at which the no-cheating participation constraint is met for spouse 1.

In summary, we think of the determination of the EI allocations as consisting of the following steps.

1. Given the state variables of the household S , excluding the discount factor β , determine the functions $\beta_j^*(\alpha)$.
2. If $\beta < \beta^{**}$, then the household is not able to implement efficient allocations. Then $a_j^{EI} = a_j^N$, $j = 1, 2$.
3. If $\beta \geq \beta^{**}$, the household is able to implement an efficient time allocation. Let α_0 denote the notational Pareto weight. Then

$$\{a_1^{EI}, a_2^{EI}\} = \begin{cases} \{a_1^E(\alpha_0), a_2^E(\alpha_0)\} & \text{if } \beta_1^*(\alpha_0) \leq \beta \text{ and } \beta_2^*(\alpha_0) \leq \beta \\ \{a_1^E((\beta_1^*)^{-1}(\beta)), a_2^E((\beta_1^*)^{-1}(\beta))\} & \text{if } \beta_1^*(\alpha_0) > \beta \\ \{a_1^E((\beta_2^*)^{-1}(\beta)), a_2^E((\beta_2^*)^{-1}(\beta))\} & \text{if } \beta_2^*(\alpha_0) > \beta \end{cases},$$

where $(\beta_j^*)^{-1}$ is the inverse of β_j^* .

2.3 Summary

We summarize the results of this section with the aid of Figure 2. For any given state variable S describing the household, there exists a unique (static) household Nash equilibrium of actions $\{a_1^N, a_2^N\}$ and payoffs $\{V_1^N, V_2^N\}$, with the pair of payoffs given by the intersection of the two lines in Figure 2. Varying the Pareto weight α over $(0, 1)$ in the weighted household utility function specification (PO) traces out the Pareto frontier. When we impose the side constraint that the Pareto weight must be chosen so that each spouse obtains at least their payoff V_i^N , this defines a lower bound $\underline{\alpha}(V^N)$ at which the “participation” constraint is just binding for spouse 1 and an upper bound $\bar{\alpha}(V^N)$ at which the participation constraint is just binding for spouse 2. If the notional value of the Pareto weight, α_0 , falls in this interval, then that value is used to define the efficient outcome, which will be the same as in the unconstrained case. If the value of α_0 is less than $\underline{\alpha}(V^N)$, then the efficient outcome is determined using the Pareto weight $\underline{\alpha}(V^N)$. If, instead, $\alpha_0 > \bar{\alpha}(V^N)$, then the efficient outcome is determined using the Pareto weight $\bar{\alpha}(V^N)$.

The “dynamic” participation constraint imposes a tighter set of restrictions on the α choice problem than does the “static” participation constraint, except in the extreme case of $\beta = 1$. For any $\beta < 1$, there either exists a nonempty interval $[\underline{\alpha}(V^N, \beta), \bar{\alpha}(V^N, \beta)] \subset [\underline{\alpha}(V^N), \bar{\alpha}(V^N)] = [\underline{\alpha}(V^N, \beta = 1), \bar{\alpha}(V^N, \beta = 1)]$, or the set of implementable α is empty, and inefficient behavior results. Put another way, for any household characterized by S , there exists a critical value $\beta^{**}(S)$, with any $\beta < \beta^{**}(S)$ inducing the household to behave inefficiently. When there does exist a nonempty set of α that satisfy the dynamic participation constraint, the ultimate household allocation is determined in the same manner as it was when we imposed the static participation constraint.

3 Econometric Specification

A household “stage game” equilibrium is uniquely determined given a vector S of state variables that, given the functional form assumptions maintained, completely characterize the preferences of both spouses and the choice set of the household. The state variables are given by

$$S = \begin{pmatrix} \lambda_1 \\ \lambda_2 \\ \delta_1 \\ \delta_2 \\ w_1 \\ w_2 \\ Y \\ \alpha \end{pmatrix}.$$

The vector S uniquely determines the efficient and inefficient solutions to the household’s time allocation problem *given* the mode of behavior: inefficient (Nash equilibrium), Pareto optimal, or constrained Pareto optimal. Adding the discount factor β allows us to determine which mode of behavior is observed, thus

$$D_b = D_b(S; \beta), \quad b \in B,$$

uniquely determines the time allocation decisions of the household under behavioral specification b , which belongs to the set B of four household behavioral specifications we consider in this paper. The identification and estimation problems relate to our ability to recover the parameters that characterize a particular mapping D_b .

In terms of the econometrics of the problem, identification and estimator implementation will depend on assumptions regarding the observability of the elements of S . Given the data at hand, we consider the subvector $S_1 = (w_1 \ w_2 \ Y)'$ observable for all households. Since wages are only observed for working spouses, clearly this implies that our sample contains only dual-earner households. This restriction results in us losing about 12 percent of our sample, with the benefit of making the identification conditions for the model considerably more transparent. We will comment further on this assumption below when we discuss identification issues.

The subvector $S_2 = (\lambda_1 \ \lambda_2 \ \delta_1 \ \delta_2 \ \alpha)$ contains the unobservable variables to the analyst. In our parametric estimation of the model, we specify a population distribution of S_2 , the parameters of which, in addition to those describing the distribution of β in the population, constitute the primitive parameters of the model. We allow considerable flexibility in our parametric specification of the joint distribution of $(\lambda_1 \ \lambda_2 \ \delta_1 \ \delta_2)$ through the following procedure. Let x be a four-variate normal vector, with

$$x \stackrel{i.i.d.}{\sim} N(\mu, \Sigma), \tag{9}$$

with μ a 4×1 vector of means and Σ a 4×4 symmetric, positive definite matrix. A draw from this distribution, x , is mapped into the appropriate state space through the vector of known functions, M (which is 4×1). In our case, we have the following specification of the “link” function,

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_1 : \quad & M_1(x) = \text{logit}(x_1) \\ \lambda_2 : \quad & M_2(x) = \text{logit}(x_2) \\ \delta_1 : \quad & M_3(x) = \frac{\exp(x_3)}{1 + \exp(x_3) + \exp(x_4)} \\ \delta_2 : \quad & M_4(x) = \frac{\exp(x_4)}{1 + \exp(x_3) + \exp(x_4)} \end{aligned} .$$

Thus, the joint distribution of these 4 household characteristics is described by a total of 14 parameters, 4 from μ and the 10 nonredundant parameters in Σ .⁷

The two other parameters upon which the model solution depends are the Pareto weight parameter, α , and the discount factor β . As is well-known from the collective household model literature, estimation of the Pareto weight α is not possible without auxiliary functional form assumptions and/or exclusion restrictions. While our functional form assumptions in principle allow for the identification of α within the various model specifications in which it appears, in practice identification of this parameter is problematic. As a result, we restrict its value to $\alpha = 0.5$ in all of the estimation performed below. This is not as severe a restriction as it appears on the surface, since in the Constrained Pareto Optimal and Endogenous Interaction models, the side constraints that the efficient solution is required to satisfy results, in general, in a nondegenerate distribution of α in the population, even if the “notional” value of α (α_0) is the same for all households. As we will see in the results reported below, a substantial proportion of households implementing choices that produce utility outcomes on the Pareto frontier use a value of α not equal to 0.5.

It is possible to allow for variability of β in the population (though we have restricted the spouses in any given marriage to share the same β), and we have estimated the various behavioral specifications allowing for this additional source of heterogeneity, after restricting β to follow a one-parameter power distribution. We found that the heterogeneous β model fit the data less well than the homogeneous β specification, and so report only the common β estimates.

⁷When estimating Σ , it is necessary to choose a parameterization that ensures that any estimate $\hat{\Sigma}$ is symmetric, positive definite. The most straightforward way of doing so is to use the Cholesky decomposition of Σ . There are 10 parameters to estimate, with

$$C = \begin{pmatrix} \exp(c_1) & c_2 & c_3 & c_4 \\ 0 & \exp(c_5) & c_6 & c_7 \\ 0 & 0 & \exp(c_8) & c_9 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \exp(c_{10}) \end{pmatrix} ,$$

and $\Sigma(c) = C'C$. The $\exp(\cdot)$ functions on the diagonal ensure that each of these elements are strictly positive, which is a requirement for the matrix to be positive definite.

3.1 Simulation-Based Estimation

Let the parameter vector of the model be given by $\Omega = (\mu' \text{vec}(\Sigma)' \omega)'$, where $\text{vec}(\Sigma)$ is a column vector containing all of the nonredundant parameters in Σ , ω is empty or contains β in the Endogenous Interaction specification, so that Ω is a 15×1 vector in the most “heterogeneous” model we consider. We have access to a sample of married households taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from the 2005 wave, which we consider to a random sample from the population of married households in the U.S. within a given age range. In terms of the observable information available to us, we see the decision variables for household i ,

$$A_i = (h_{1,i} \tau_{1,i} h_{2,i} \tau_{2,i}),$$

and we see the state variables

$$S_{1,i} = (w_{1,i} w_{2,i} Y_i).$$

Define the union of these two vectors, which is the vector of all of the observable variables of the analysis, by $Q_i = (A_i S_{1,i})$, so that the $N \times 7$ data matrix is

$$Q = \begin{bmatrix} Q_1 \\ Q_2 \\ \vdots \\ Q_N \end{bmatrix}.$$

We choose m characteristics of the empirical distribution of Q upon which to base our estimator. Denote the values of these characteristics by the $m \times 1$ vector Z .

Simulation proceeds as follows. For each of the N households in the analysis, we draw NR values of x , and also β when it is included in a model specification and allowed to be heterogeneous. For simplicity, we will consider the set of simulation draws as generating $(\lambda_1 \lambda_2 \delta_1 \delta_2 \beta)$, even when β is treated as fixed in the population. Let a given simulation draw of these state variables be given by $\theta_{i,j}$, $i = 1, \dots, N$; $j = 1, \dots, NR$. The draws $\theta_{i,j}$ are functions of the parameter vector Ω , which we emphasize by writing $\theta_{i,j}(\Omega)$. Given a value of Ω , for each household i we solve for household decisions under behavioral mode b , $(a_{1,i,j}^b, a_{2,i,j}^b)(S_{1,i}, \theta_{i,j}) = D_b(S_{1,i}, \theta_{i,j})$, $j = 1, \dots, NR$, where $a_{s,i,j}^b$ is the market labor supply and time in household production of spouse s in household i given draws $\theta_{i,j}$ under behavioral regime b . The time allocations associated with the simulation are stacked in a

new matrix

$$\tilde{Q}_b(\Omega) = \begin{bmatrix} A_{1,1}^b(\Omega) & S_{1,1} \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ A_{1,NR}^b(\Omega) & S_{1,1} \\ A_{2,1}^b(\Omega) & S_{1,2} \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ A_{2,NR}^b(\Omega) & S_{1,2} \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ A_{N,1}(\Omega) & S_{1,N} \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ A_{N,NR}(\Omega) & S_{1,N} \end{bmatrix},$$

where $A_{i,j}^b(\Omega) = (a_{1,i,j}^b \ a_{2,i,j}^b)$. The analogous value of $Z_b(\Omega)$ is computed from the $(N \times NR) \times 7$ matrix $\tilde{Q}_b(\Omega)$. Given a positive-definite, conformable weighting matrix W , the estimator of Ω is given by

$$\hat{\Omega}_b = \arg \min_{\Omega} (Z - Z_b(\Omega))' W (Z - Z_b(\Omega)).$$

The weighting matrix W is computed by resampling the original data Q a total of 5000 times, and for each resampling we compute the value of Z , which we denote \hat{Z}_k for replication k . We then form

$$\hat{Z} = \begin{bmatrix} \hat{Z}_1 \\ \hat{Z}_2 \\ \vdots \\ \hat{Z}_{5000} \end{bmatrix}.$$

W is the covariance matrix of \hat{Z} . Since a major focus of our empirical investigation is a comparison of the behavioral models in B in terms of their ability to fit the sample moments Z , it is advantageous to utilize a weighting matrix W that is not model dependent.

3.2 Identification

As is true of many (or most) simulation-based estimators, especially those used to estimate relatively complex behavioral models, providing exact conditions for identification is not feasible. Nevertheless, it may be useful to understand what features of the data generating process (DGP) are being used to obtain point estimates of the parameters in our ‘flexible’ parametric model of the household. With this goal in mind, we proceed through a fairly careful consideration of nonparametric identification of the first three behavioral specifications. We will then discuss the reasons that the Endogenous Interaction model is

not nonparametrically identified, which is the reason for our interest in the estimation of a flexible parametric specification of the distribution of primitive parameters.

The identification arguments we present in this section condition on observed wages, and do not allow for measurement error in any of the variables included in Q_i , which contains the conditioning variables $S_{1,i} = (w_{1,i} \ w_{2,1} \ Y_i)$, as well as the four time allocation measures $A_i = (h_{1,i} \ \tau_{1,i} \ h_{2,i} \ \tau_{2,i})$. We begin by considering the nonparametric identification case. We assume that there exists a joint distribution of $F_S(s)$, with the vector $S = (w_1 \ w_2 \ Y \ \lambda_1 \ \lambda_2 \ \delta_1 \ \delta_2 \ \alpha \ \beta)'$ in the most general model. An individual household in the PSID subsample is considered to be an i.i.d. draw from the distribution F_S . No parametric assumptions on F_S are made, at this point.

3.2.1 All Households Behave Inefficiently (Static Nash equilibrium)

In the case of Nash equilibrium, it is straightforward to show that the model is nonparametrically identified in the sense that we can define a nonparametric, maximum likelihood estimator (NPMLE) of F_S in the following (constructive) manner.

Proposition 4 *The distribution F_S is nonparametrically identified from Q when the behavioral rule is static Nash equilibrium and there are no corner solutions.*

Proof. The Nash equilibrium is the unique fixed point of the reaction functions of spouse 1 and spouse 2 given the time allocations of the other spouse. Given that both spouses work, we observe the vector $(w_{1,j} \ w_{2,j}, Y_j)$ for all households, so that the marginal distribution F_{S_1} is nonparametrically identified by construction. Given the observation Q_j , we can invert the reaction functions for household j to yield the two equation linear system

$$\begin{aligned}\delta_{1,j} &= \frac{B_{1,j}(1 - B_{2,j})}{1 - B_{1,j}B_{2,j}} \\ \delta_{2,j} &= \frac{B_{2,j}(1 - B_{1,j})}{1 - B_{1,j}B_{2,j}},\end{aligned}$$

where $B_{i,j} = w_{i,j}\tau_{i,j}/(M_j + w_{i,j}\tau_{i,j})$, with $M_j = w_{1,j}h_{1,j} + w_{2,j}h_{2,j} + Y_j$. Given constant returns to scale in household production, $\delta_{3,j} = 1 - \delta_{1,j} - \delta_{2,j}$, and we can invert the remaining two equations in the system of reaction functions to obtain

$$\lambda_{i,j} = \frac{\delta_{3,j}w_{i,j}(T - h_{i,j} - \tau_{i,j})}{M_j + \delta_{3,j}w_{i,j}(T - h_{i,j} - \tau_{i,j})}, \quad i = 1, 2.$$

Since these values of $(\delta_{1,j}, \delta_{2,j}, \alpha_{1,j}, \alpha_{2,j})$ are uniquely determined by $(h_{1,j}, \tau_{1,j}, h_{2,j}, \tau_{2,j}, w_{1,j}, w_{2,j}, Y_j)$, we “observe” the complete vector of values $S_j = (w_{1,j} \ w_{2,j} \ Y_j \ \lambda_{1,j} \ \lambda_{2,j} \ \delta_{1,j} \ \delta_{2,j})$, and the nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator of F_S is the empirical distribution of $\{S_j\}_{j=1}^N$.

■

Note that the restriction of no corner solutions is essential in our ability to nonparametrically identify the model. Say that, for example, $h_{1,j} = 0$. Even if the offered wage $w_{1,j}$ were available, an unlikely event, there would exist a set of values of $\lambda_{1,j}$ consistent with the observed choices and the observed state variables, with no way to assess the likelihood of any value in the set relative to any other. In the presence of any kind of truncation or censoring, nonparametric identification of the complete distribution is typically impossible, since some functional form assumptions are required to assign likelihoods over sets of values of parameters consistent with observed outcomes.

3.2.2 All Households Behave Efficiently

Proposition 5 *The distribution F_S is nonparametrically identified from Q when the behavioral rule is Pareto efficiency, there are no corner solutions, data points are consistent with the model, and α is known.*

Proof. Household time allocation is determined by solving the system of four first order conditions associated with (5). We find that

$$\begin{aligned}\delta_{1j} &= \frac{B_{1j}(1 - B_{2,j})}{1 - B_{1j}B_{2,j}} \\ \delta_{2j} &= \frac{B_{2j}(1 - B_{1,j})}{1 - B_{1j}B_{2,j}},\end{aligned}$$

the same as in the Nash equilibrium case. Conditional on these values of δ_{1j} and δ_{2j} ($\Rightarrow \delta_{3j} = 1 - \delta_{1j} - \delta_{2j}$ under the CRS assumption) and a value of α , we find

$$\begin{aligned}\lambda_{1j} &= \frac{1}{\alpha}R_{1j} \\ \lambda_{2j} &= \frac{1}{1 - \alpha}R_{2j}\end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}R_{1j} &\equiv \frac{C_{1j}(1 - C_{2j})}{1 - C_{1j}C_{2j}} \\ R_{2j} &= \frac{C_{2j}(1 - C_{1j})}{1 - C_{1j}C_{2j}}.\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}C_{1j} &= \frac{\delta_{3j}w_{1j}(T - h_{1j} - \tau_{1j})}{\delta_{3j}w_{1j}(T - h_{1j} - \tau_{1j}) + M_j} \\ C_{2j} &= \frac{\delta_{3j}w_{1j}(T - h_{2j} - \tau_{2j})}{\delta_{3j}w_{2j}(T - h_{2j} - \tau_{2j}) + M_j}.\end{aligned}$$

The values of C_{1j} and C_{2j} lie in the unit interval for all j , which implies that λ_{1j} and λ_{2j} are always positive. However, for given values of α and all other state variables and choice variables, either or both λ_{1j} and λ_{2j} may not belong to the open unit interval. In this case, the data for household j are not consistent with the model and are not used in the estimation of F_S , which is the empirical distribution of $\{S_j\}_{j \in \varkappa}$, where \varkappa is the set of household indices for which λ_{1j} and λ_{2j} both belong to the open unit interval. ■

We found that the implied values of λ_{1j} and λ_{2j} belonged to the unit interval for all of the sample cases. In the proposition, in constructing the NPMLE for F_S we specified that only implied values of the preference parameters that satisfied our theoretical restrictions would be utilized. One could argue that the satisfaction of theoretical restrictions to be a necessary condition to define the estimator, instead. In this particular application, we did not have to explicitly confront this problem.

3.2.3 Constrained Efficient Case

The constrained efficient case imposes a side constraint on the efficient solution, one which insures that each spouse attains a utility value at least as large as what could be obtained in the inefficient, Nash equilibrium case. This makes the mapping from the observed time allocations and observed state variables into the unobserved state variables more complex. We have not been able to prove the uniqueness of the mapping, and instead we have used the following procedure to define and implement a nonparametric estimator of F_S .

First, from the previous two propositions we know that the implied values of the technology parameters is independent of α and is the same mapping from the data into (δ_1, δ_2) for the Nash equilibrium and Pareto Optimality cases. Thus, the same mapping will apply here, so the only issue is in defining the mapping from the data into the preference parameters. To compute this, we have merely solved for the efficient outcomes under a grid of Pareto weights, α_i^G , where $\alpha_i^G = 0.001 \times i$, $i = 1, \dots, 999$. At each value of α_i^G , we determine the values of $(\lambda_1^i, \lambda_2^i) = (\lambda_1, \lambda_2)(\alpha_i^G)$ associated with it. We then determine the payoffs associated with those values of the preference and technology parameters given the observed, decisions and state variables, and compare those with the payoffs that all of these state variables would generate under the static Nash equilibrium. If the welfare values satisfy the “short-run” participation constraint, then that value of α_i^G is included in the set of feasible α values, which we denote α^F . We then select an $\alpha \in \alpha^F$ using the following criterion:

1. If $\alpha_0 \in \alpha^F$, then the values of the preference parameters are $(\lambda_1, \lambda_2)(\alpha_0)$.
2. If $\alpha_0 < \min \alpha^F$, then the preference parameters are $(\lambda_1, \lambda_2)(\min \alpha^F)$.
3. If $\alpha_0 > \max \alpha^F$, then the preference parameters are $(\lambda_1, \lambda_2)(\max \alpha^F)$.

In implementing this procedure, we found that, as in the PO case, all implied values of the preference parameters belonged to the unit interval. Moreover, we found that the

sets α^F were always “connected,” in the sense that when α^F consisted of more than two elements, there were no values of α_i^G that were greater than $\min \alpha^F$ and less than $\max \alpha^F$ that did not belong to α^F . Since all of this was done numerically, we cannot claim that for a finer partition of the grid such cases would not emerge.

3.2.4 Endogenous Interaction Case

We cannot show that F_S is nonparametrically identified in the EI case, because it is simple to provide counterexamples to show that it is not. We can continue to assume that the technology parameters are uniquely determined without reference to the behavioral regime or value of α used in efficient cases. The fundamental identification problems then concern the discount factor β and the preference parameters, λ_1 and λ_2 .

Since we could not identify the notional value of α_0 nonparametrically, it comes as no surprise that the same is true of β . We know that if $\beta = 0$, no efficient allocations can be supported, and the resulting time allocations are all generated in NE. Conversely, as $\beta \rightarrow 1$, all households make efficient time allocation decisions, and the preference parameters implied by the data are those generated under PO. Both sets of values of the preference parameters are one-to-one mappings from the data, so we have two separate estimators of F_S .

Unfortunately, the lack of identification result continues to hold even after fixing β at some predetermined value β_0 . Having a notional value of α , α_0 , and a fixed value of β , β_0 , we can find cases of observed state variable vectors, S_1 , and decisions, A , that yield two valid implied values of (λ_1, λ_2) , one under static Nash equilibrium and one other dynamic efficiency. By this we mean that the implied values of preferences and technology assuming static Nash equilibrium are such that no efficient allocation is implementable given β_0 . At the same time, using implied values of preferences and technology assuming an efficient allocation, we can determine values of the preference parameters that imply the existence of an implementable solution in the sense of satisfying the long-run participation constraint. Obviously, the two sets of preference parameters are not identical, and there is no way to differentiate between them when forming the NPMLE of F_S .

3.2.5 The Flexible Parametric Case

Under the parametric specification of the unobserved state variables described at the beginning of this Section, the estimation problem becomes one of estimating a set of parameters θ assumed to completely characterize the distribution $F_S(\theta)$, instead of the function F_S itself. In the case of the NE and PO behavioral specifications the parameter vector θ is clearly identified, since we showed that F_S itself was nonparametrically identified. In this case, using the nonparametric MLE for F_S , \hat{F}_S , we can define estimators for $\hat{\theta}_M = \arg \min_{\theta} M(\hat{F}_S, F_S(\theta))$ for some distance function M , and the argument for the identification of θ will be dependent on properties of M .

In the cases CPO and EI, this type of argument is not available to us, since F_S is not nonparametrically identified. The flexible parametric specification aids in overcoming some of the identification problems associated with the CPO and EI cases by smoothing the density over regions in which unique solutions to the inversion problem associated with the nonparametric estimator do not exist. While we cannot establish formal identification of θ using the MSM estimator, the parameter estimates we have obtained using the MSM estimator with the flexible parametric specification generally fall into line with those obtained using the nonparametric estimator, in the cases when it was available for comparison. In the CPO and EI cases, the parameter estimates were intermediate to those obtained in the NE and PO cases, as one would expect them to be on a theoretical level, which lends some credibility to the notion that the estimator was well-behaved and chose appropriate points in the parameter space.

A final word regarding identification. While theoretically, under the flexible parametric specification, both α_0 and β are identified, we choose to fix α_0 at the value 0.5, and estimate β as a free, but homogenous, parameter in the population. We choose to fix α_0 , since we were especially interested in the behavioral heterogeneity in *ex post* values of α . While the estimate of β we obtain is “low,” the value makes sense when evaluated in the context of the estimated distribution of other state variables in the model.

4 Empirical Results

We begin this Section by presenting the sample selection criteria used in creating the final sample from the PSID with which we work. This is followed by a discussion of the estimates of the distributions of primitive parameters in the “nonparametric” analysis for the three identified models: Nash equilibrium, Pareto efficiency, and Constrained Pareto efficiency. We then move on to our focus of interest, which are the estimates from the flexible parametric analysis.

4.1 Sample Selection Criteria and Descriptive Statistics

We use sample information from the 2005 wave of the PSID. All models are essentially static, and therefore we only utilize cross-sectional information from this wave of the survey. We only considered households in which the head was married, with the spouse present in the household. In this wave, the PSID obtained the standard information regarding usual hours of work over the previous year for both spouses, and this information corresponds to h_1 and h_2 in the model. Every few years, the PSID also includes a question regarding the usual hours devoted to housework by each spouse, and this information is included in the 2005 wave. The responses to these items are interpreted as τ_1 and τ_2 in the model. These time allocation questions are regarded as referring to the same time period. We use total hours worked from the previous year and labor earnings for each spouse to infer a wage rate, w_i for spouse i . In addition, information is available on the nonlabor income of

the spouses over the previous year, and we divide this amount by 52 to obtain a weekly nonlabor income level, Y .

We only utilize information from households in which both spouses are between the ages of 30 and 49, inclusive. In addition to this age requirement, we excluded all households with any child less than 7 years of age, since the household production function is likely to be far different when small children are present than when they are not. We also excluded couples with what we considered to be excessively high time allocations to housework and the labor market, namely, those with over 100 hours combined in these two activities. We selected this amount since we set $T = 112$, which we arrived at by assuming 16 hours to allocate to leisure, housework, and the labor market for each of the seven days in a week. We also excluded households reporting a nonlabor income level of more than \$1000 a week, on the grounds that such people were likely to be generating a significant amount of self-employment income, making the labor supply information they supplied difficult to interpret. Not many households were lost to this exclusion criterion.

By far the most significant sample selection criterion we imposed was the one requiring both spouses to work. If a spouse does not work, then clearly we have no wage information for that spouse, making the nonparametric analysis we discuss above and report on below impossible to implement. Within the flexible parametric estimator we implement, it would be possible to allow for corner solutions in labor supply if we are willing to impose a parametric assumption regarding the wage offer process.⁸ While this allows for more model generality, in principle, it comes at the expense of having to take a position on the partially unobservable wage process. We chose to follow the route of ruling out corner solutions, allowing us to condition all of our analysis on observed wages. Because we restricted our attention to households without small children, imposing the condition that both spouses supply time to the market resulted in a reduction of 12 percent in our (otherwise) final sample. We were left with 823 valid cases, which were those satisfying the conditions stated above and with no missing data on any of the state and decision variables included in the analysis.

A description of the decisions and state variables is contained in Table 1. As has been often remarked upon in other analyses of household behavior that include time in housework, the average time spent in the both housework and labor supply to the market is very similar for husbands and wives. On average, husbands spend approximately 7 hours more per week in the labor market than their wives, but devote 7 hours less to housework. Under our assumption that each spouse has 112 ‘disposable’ hours of time to allocate each week, on average spends slightly more than one-half of their time consuming leisure. We also note that the wife’s distributions of hours in the market and housework are much more disperse than the corresponding distributions of husbands’. In terms of market work, this is undoubtedly due to the fact that married women are much more likely to be employed

⁸This was precisely what was done in an earlier version of this paper, when we only considered labor supply in a model without a household production component.

in part-time work than their husbands (see, e.g., Mabli (2007)). The limited amount of variation in the distribution of husbands' housework is mainly due to the floor effect - most observations are clustered in the neighborhood of zero.

In terms of the observed state variables of the analysis, the mean wage of husbands is approximately 39 percent greater than the mean wage of wives, and exhibits considerably more dispersion, some of it due to the presence of a few wage outliers among the husbands (the maximum wage of wives is \$80.50, while the maximum wage of husbands is \$144.93). Average weekly nonlabor income of the household is \$118.15, and this distribution is quite disperse, even though the sample is restricted to households receiving no more than \$1000 of nonlabor income per week. No nonlabor income is reported by 27 percent of sample households.

Table 2 contains the zero-order correlation matrix of the variables reported in Table 1. There is no correlation between the labor supply and housework of husbands, while there is a reasonably strong negative correlation (-0.189) between them for wives. There is a strong positive correlation (0.321) between the times spent in housework by husbands and wives. The wage of a husband and the labor supply of his wife have a negative correlation of -0.132, while wives with high wages tend to spend less time in housework. There are no particularly noteworthy correlations between household nonlabor income and other variables in the analysis, with the possible exception of the husband's wage (0.115). The correlation between the wages of the spouses (0.294) indicates positive assortative mating in the marriage market.

4.2 Nonparametric Estimation of the Distribution of State Variables

Under the Nash equilibrium, Pareto efficient, and constrained Pareto efficient modeling assumptions, we were able to obtain estimates of the distributions of S in our sample. In all cases other than static Nash equilibrium, we established that the Pareto weight parameter α was not identified. Accordingly, in all of these models, we simply assume that the 'notional' Pareto weight is 0.5. Of course, the Nash equilibrium solution is not a function of the parameter α .

In Section 3.2.2, we noted that the mapping from the time allocation decisions and the observed state variables, the wages of the spouses and household nonlabor income, did not necessarily produce values of the preference parameters λ_1 and λ_2 that belonged to $(0, 1)$. Nevertheless, all of our 823 sample cases generated values of λ_1 and λ_2 in the unit interval, so that all cases are used to generate 'data' on preferences and household production parameters that are used to form the nonparametric estimator of F_S .

Table 3 contains estimates of the means and standard deviations of the marginal distributions of preference and production parameters of the model under the three estimable behavioral specifications. As discussed above, under our functional form assumptions on preferences and household production, the implied value of the production parameters δ_{1j} and δ_{2j} for household j are the same functions of the decisions of household j , D_j , and the

observed state variables for household j , S_{Oj} , for each of the three behavioral models for which we obtain nonparametric estimates of F_S . This explains the fact that the estimated means and standard deviations of the production parameters are identical across the three behavioral specifications. We note that wives have a higher average productivity in household production than husbands, with the mean for wives being about 41 percent larger. There is also slightly more dispersion in the wives' productivity parameter.

Large differences are observed across the three specifications in terms of the distribution of the preference parameters. Given that the Nash equilibrium outcomes are inefficient, it is not surprising to find that the means of the preference parameters under Nash equilibrium are considerably less than they are under constrained or unconstrained Pareto efficiency. In all three behavioral cases, the average weight placed on the private good, leisure, is smaller for wives than their husbands. In the unconstrained Pareto weight case, the average weight placed on leisure by husbands is 0.580, in comparison with an average leisure weight of 0.430 for wives. There are similar levels of dispersion in the distributions of preference parameters for husbands and wives across the three behavioral specifications.

Comparing estimates across columns two and three, it is interesting to note that the constraint that the payoffs under the efficient solution are at least as large as the payoffs under Nash equilibrium for both spouses is binding for a number of sample cases given the notional value of $\alpha = 0.5$. This is evidenced by the differences in the preference parameter distributions. Imposing this particular constraint narrows the difference in the mean of spousal preference parameters, while reducing dispersion as well.

Recall that all three estimates of F_S , are equally "valid," and no statistical criterion can be used to distinguish between the behavioral specifications given that they are all based on (different) one-to-one mappings from the data and observed state space to the unobserved state space. In the next section, when we make flexibly parametric assumptions regarding the distributions of the parameters, we will be able to compare the performance of the various behavioral models, including the Endogenous Interaction specification.

4.3 Parametric Estimation of the Distribution of State Variables

Before looking at the estimates produced by the parametric estimator under the four behavioral specifications, it may be worthwhile to consider why we expect them to differ to some degree from the nonparametric estimators of F_S discussed in the preceding subsection. First, we have assumed that the distribution of the state variables (subvector) $S_U = (\lambda_1 \lambda_2 \delta_1 \delta_2)$ is independent of the state variables $S_O = (w_1 w_2 Y)$. This is a strong assumption, but without specifying some form of parametric dependence between S_U and S_O , it would not be possible to relax it. There are reasons to doubt the validity of the independence assumption. For example, a spouse i with a low value of leisure might have worked and invested more in the past, so that w_i and Y may be negatively related to λ_i . To fully account for such dependencies, we would require a life cycle household model with capital accumulation, which is beyond the scope of the current paper.

Second, while our parametric specification of the distribution of S_U is reasonably flexible, it does impose restrictions on the data. These restrictions are what allow us to say something about the relative abilities of the four different behavioral specifications to fit the data. Nevertheless, different parametric specifications of the distribution of S_U could lead to different inferences concerning which behavioral framework is most consistent with the data features chosen for the MSM estimator.

Table 4 contains the MSM estimates of the four behavioral specifications. The estimates presented were computed as follows. We obtained point estimates of the 14 parameters used to characterize the distribution of S_U for each of the four specifications. We then took a large number of draws (one million) from the estimated distribution of S_U , and computed the means and standard deviations of each of the components of the vector S_U . In the EI specification, we also estimated the discount factor β , which was constrained to be homogeneous in the population. The notional value of the Pareto weight α was fixed at 0.5 in all specifications. For specification CPO, in each simulation we also computed the Pareto weight at which the efficient outcome was implemented. For specification EI, in each simulation we computed the Pareto weight at which the efficient outcome was implemented in the cases where it was possible to implement an efficient outcome. The means and standard deviations of the ex post α distribution are presented in columns three and four of the table. We also present the proportion of simulated cases used in the estimation for which an efficient solution was obtainable (only relevant for column four), and the proportion of efficient solutions that were implemented at the notional α value of 0.5, which is relevant for columns three and four. The last row in the table reports the value of the distance metric for the model; obviously, a lower value indicates that the model is able to better fit the selected moments at the optimally-chosen parameter estimates.

The Nash equilibrium specification produces estimates of the mean values of the preference parameters, λ_1 and λ_2 , roughly in accord with those produced by the nonparametric estimator. The estimated population dispersion in the parameters is far greater under the flexible parametric estimator of the distribution than under the nonparametric estimator. The estimated distribution of production function parameters is quite a bit different under the flexible parametric estimator compared with the nonparametric results. We still find that, on average, wives are more productive in housework than their husbands, with the estimated means being 0.178 and 0.138, respectively. The nonparametric estimates of the means is 0.106 and 0.075, instead. There is also considerably more estimated dispersion in these parameters using the parametric estimator. Our sense is that most of these differences arise from the restriction that the state variables in S_U are independently distributed with respect to S_O imposed using the parametric estimator that is not imposed under the nonparametric estimator, rather than arising from the parametric restrictions on the distribution of S_U .

The estimated moments S_U , under the assumption of Pareto efficiency and a notional welfare weight of 0.5, are presented in the second column. As regards the preference parameter distributions, we see that the mean estimated leisure weights for both spouses are

considerably larger than we found in the Nash equilibrium case in Table 4. The estimated mean λ_2 for wives is virtually identical using either the nonparametric or parametric estimator, while the estimated value for husbands is slightly smaller using the nonparametric estimator. The estimated dispersion in the preference parameters is quite small in this case, in comparison with the Nash equilibrium case in the first column or the analogous column of Table 3. The estimated mean value of the production parameters is roughly similar to what was obtained using the nonparametric estimator, and both moment estimates are considerably smaller than in the Nash equilibrium case. The estimated dispersion of these parameters in the population is considerably less than under Nash equilibrium.

It is interesting to compare the distance measures associated with these two models. Under our assumption that α is known and equal to 0.5, both models have the same number of estimated parameters (characterizing the parametric distribution of S_U). We see that the NE model does a superior job in fitting the selected moments than does the PO model. While we do not conducted a formal test of these differences, because of the computational time involved in constructing bootstrap confidence intervals., the difference does seem important. When we compare these distances with those obtained under the other two model specifications, we will have a better sense of how ‘significant’ these differences are.

Column three contains the estimated moments of S_U from the Constrained Pareto Optimal specification. We see that requiring Pareto efficient allocations to give each spouse at least the same amount of welfare as they would obtain under Nash equilibrium has notable effects on estimated moments of S_U and the ability of an efficient specification of household behavior to fit the data moments. As we might expect, the estimated means in column three are more similar to those in column two than to those obtained under the Nash equilibrium specification. The estimated distributions from the CPO specification exhibit more dispersion than under the PO specification, with the exception of the wife’s productivity parameter, δ_2 .

The most interesting comparison between the CPO and PO specification is in terms of model fit, however. First, recall that if all parameter draws from the distribution of S_U satisfied the ‘participation constraint’ (given the sample cases value of S_O), then the proportion of efficient allocations implemented at the notional value of 0.5 would be 1. As we see, this is far from the case, with over 40 percent of draws from S_U , given the household’s value of S_O , requiring an adjustment from the notional value of α . In Figure 3.a, we plot the distribution of α conditional on $\alpha \neq 0.5$. The distribution has a ‘regular’ shape, and exhibits a slight negative skew. There is a large amount of mass away from the neighborhood of [.45,.55], indicating that in some households a substantial change in the Pareto weight was required to satisfy the participation constraint. This allowance for heterogeneity in the *ex post* Pareto weight has substantially improved the ability of the model to fit the sample characteristics, with the distance measure declining by approximately 16 percent from the PO specification without the participation constraint. This specification of household behavior now produces a significant improvement in fit over the Nash equilibrium specification.

We now turn to our focus of interest, the Endogenous Interaction specification. The EI specification is also based on a fixed, notional value of the Pareto weight of 0.5, but includes the discount factor, β , a parameter not included in the PO and CPO specifications. Opening up the possibility of cheating on the efficient outcome introduces a more stringent form of a participation constraint than the one that exists in the CPO specification. Perhaps the most interesting result reported in column 4 is the proportion of sample cases that achieve utility realizations that lie on the Pareto frontier, which we estimate to be 0.941. Most households do manage to implement efficient time allocations, however, only 9.2 percent of these efficient households utilize the notional Pareto weight of 0.5. The distribution of the *ex post* value of α , excluding *ex post* values of α equal to 0.5, is exhibited in Table 3.b. The shape of this distribution is similar to the one shown in the panel above it, with a slight negative skew. The average value of *ex post* α among efficient households in the EI specification is 0.528, compared with 0.509 in the CPO specification. The dispersion in *ex post* α is also greater under the EI specification. In terms of the estimates of the two first moments of the marginal distributions of preference and production parameters, the EI estimates of both moments are bounded by the analogous estimates associated with the PO and CPO specifications.

To induce any households to behave inefficiently, a relatively low value of β is required, and our point estimate is 0.522, which we interpret as referring to a yearly period, since the data refer to a representative week in 2004, and we think of participation decisions being made on a yearly basis. While the estimate of β is ‘low,’ it is not very out of line with respect to other estimates of the subjective rate of discount found in the experimental and microeconomics literature (see, for example, Hausman (1979) and Thaler (1981)). The compilation of estimates of time preference performed by Loewenstein et al. (Table 1, 2002) is striking for the huge range of values of the subjective discount rate that have been found using both experimental and empirical methods. To our knowledge, this is the first application to attempt to use a formal model with a grim trigger strategy to estimate a discount factor, so there are no other studies with which we can directly compare our estimate.⁹

The EI specification produces a marked increase in the ability of the model to fit the data features we have selected. Recall that the EI specification nests the NE and CPO models as special cases. As $\beta \rightarrow 0$, no efficient solutions could be supported, so all households would behave in an inefficient manner, with allocations given by the Nash equilibrium values. As $\beta \rightarrow 1$, all households will behave efficiently, with the only constraint on the allocations being that they satisfy the participation constraint, which imposes the

⁹Porter (1983) and Lee and Porter (1983) estimate a switching regressions model motivated by the trigger price strategy model of Green and Porter (1984). In that model of collusive behavior with imperfect signals regarding other agents’ actions, a noncooperative punishment period is entered whenever public signals indicate a high probability of cheating. The punishment period is determined endogenously, and at its termination another collusive regime is begun. The econometric framework used in the two empirical papers cited does not allow one to back out an estimate of the discount factor of firms.

restriction on α associated with the CPO specification. Moving β from a value of 1 (implicit in the CPO specification) to 0.522 results in an improvement in the distance metric of 5 percent. Moving β from a value of 0 (implicit in the NE specification) to 0.522 results in an improvement in fit of over 18 percent. The estimate of β we obtained suggests that the “shirking” problem is an important one in determining observed household time allocations.

We conclude this section by describing Figures 4-7, which use the flexible parametric specification to plot bivariate relationships between production and preference parameters with and across spouses. In each case, we used the point estimates of the parameters that characterized the flexible multivariate distribution of $(\lambda_1 \lambda_2 \delta_1 \delta_2)$, in conjunction with a large number of pseudo-random number draws from the underlying standard normal distribution, to generate pseudo-random number draws from the (estimated) joint distribution of the preference and technology parameters.

Figure 4.a contains the scatter plot of draws of λ_1 and λ_2 obtained from the Nash equilibrium specification. There is almost a perfect linear relationship between the preferences of the spouses in this case, indicating that a substantial degree of (positive) assortative mating with respect to preferences. The scatter plot of δ_1 and δ_2 under the Nash equilibrium specification is presented in Figure 4.b. In this case as well, there is indication of positive assortative mating, though the relationship is far more disperse. This is particularly true at large values of δ_1 and δ_2 .

The last two plots exhibit the relationship between the preference and technology parameters of each spouse. These are not produced by “assortative” mating, per se, but the estimated distributions are related to the characteristics of the spouse and the assumed form of behavior within the marriage. For the case of husbands, shown in Figure 4.c, there is little systematic relationship between the preference and technology parameters, with only a slight positive linear dependence discernible. For the case of wives, shown in Figure 4.d, the positive relationship between these two parameters is substantially stronger, though, once again, there is a fair amount of dispersion in the distribution of δ_2 at all values of λ_2 except the very lowest.

Figure 5 contains the analogous scatter plots for the unconstrained Pareto weight case, with the Pareto weight set at 0.5. While some of the same general shape patterns are exhibited here as we saw under the assumption of Nash equilibrium, there are some notable differences. For example, while the preference parameters of the spouses (Figure 5.a) continue to exhibit a strong positive dependence, there is far more dispersion in the distribution of λ_2 conditional on λ_1 than we observed in Figure 4.a. There is also much less of a systematic association between the spousal production function parameters (Figure 5.b) under the Pareto weight model. There is no discernible linear association between the preference and technology parameters of husbands (Figure 5.c), though there does exist a positive, yet nonlinear, association between the preference and technology parameters of wives (Figure 5.d), which was also observed under Nash equilibrium behavior (Figure 4.d).

In Figure 6 we present the scatter plots for the Constrained Pareto Optimal case.

Adding the side constraint that efficient solution payoffs must exceed inefficient Nash equilibrium payoffs has a dramatic impact on the estimated relationships between intrahousehold preference and productivity parameters. The strong positive relationship between the preference parameters of the spouses is similar to what was found in the previous two cases, but the range of values of the parameters is extended to cover the entire unit interval. The association between the productivity parameters (Figure 6.b) is now found to be weak, and slightly negative, if any systematic relationship can be discerned at all. There exists no clear relationship between the preference and productivity parameters of husbands (Figure 6.c), which was essentially the case in the other two specifications. There is a large change in this relationship for wives (Figure 6.d), however. Instead of a positive, but nonlinear association between these parameters, there is now evidence of a slightly negative, linear association.

Our preferred specification, that of Endogenous Interaction, yields implied associations between parameters somewhat intermediate to the others we have examined to this point. The association between preference parameters is positive and approximately linear, as was true in the other cases. There is little evidence of a systematic relationship between the productivity parameters of the spouses (Figure 7.b), and the range of variation in the parameters is a bit less than under the PO specification and much greater than under that of CPO. Once again, we see little systematic relationship between λ_1 and δ_1 (Figure 7.c), though there is now indication of a positive, generally linear, relationship between λ_2 and δ_2 (Figure 7.d).

4.4 Welfare Implications of the Analysis

Our estimates of the distributions of the unobserved state variables, used in conjunction with the observed state variables in the data, allow us to examine the implied joint distribution of spousal welfare within our sample. We follow the methodology used in computing the scatter plots described above to compute the intrahousehold welfare levels. For household j in the sample, defined in terms of $(w_{1j} w_{2j} Y_j)$, we draw 1000 values of the unobserved state variable from the estimated distribution under behavioral regime k . Given the entire state variable vector, we compute time allocations under behavioral rule k , and then the utility level of each spouse. We then plot the utility levels (u_1, u_2) for each state variable vector under the four behavioral regimes. The results are shown in Figure 8.

In all four behavioral regimes, there is a very strong relationship between the attained utility levels of the spouses. This is not totally unexpected given the specifications of the utility and household production functions, which posit that all consumption in the household, aside from leisure, is public. Nonetheless, the specification in and of itself does not specify the preference weights associated with the public good, which, in principle, could have been small.

Within each figure we see that a strong majority of the points lie above the 45-degree line, indicating that wives have a somewhat higher payoff on average under our cardinal

utility representation. If husbands and wives were perfectly symmetric, in the sense that $\lambda_1 = \lambda_2$, $\delta_1 = \delta_2$, and $w_1 = w_2$, then all utility outcomes in each figure should lie on the 45-degree line. In Figures 8.b through 8.d, in which all outcomes involve the Pareto weight parameter α , even under perfect symmetry of preferences, productivity, and wages, values of α different than 0.5 will produce outcomes off the 45-degree line. Since the notional Pareto weight is always set to 0.5, utility realizations are produced by asymmetry in spousal characteristics, both observed and unobserved.

As was the case as regards the parameter estimates, the plot of utility payoffs for the Endogenous Interaction case (Figure 8.d) is intermediate to those generated from the Nash equilibrium (Figure 8.a) and Pareto efficiency cases (Figures 8.b and 8.c). The correlation between welfare outcomes is highest in the Nash equilibrium case and lowest in the unconstrained Pareto environment.

5 Conclusion

In this paper we have examined household time allocation decisions in a variety of behavioral frameworks, including one, that of Endogenous Interaction, that nests efficient and inefficient behavioral choices within it. We have worked within a very specific specification of preferences and household production technology, but considered very general forms of household heterogeneity, which allows any of the models to perfectly “fit” the data. The point of this portion of the analysis, if it need to be made, was that strong functional form assumptions and restrictions on the distributions of state variables in the populations are required to identify any of these behavioral models, and testing between them cannot be done without resort to a number of nontestable identifying restrictions.

The main contribution of the paper was the development of the model of Endogenous Interaction, which had households endogenously sorting into inefficient and efficient time allocation regimes. Under our flexible parametric assumptions regarding the distribution of household preference and technology parameters, we found evidence that the Endogenous Interaction model was the most consistent with the set of sample characteristics we used to implement a Method of Simulated Moments estimator. Interestingly enough, the worse performance in terms of the value of the distance function was associated with the Pareto Optimal model (with a fixed Pareto weight of 0.5). The performance of the Pareto weight model was considerably improved when we added the side constraint that each individual had a utility payoff on the Pareto frontier that was at least as high as what they received in Nash equilibrium. The fit of the efficiency-based model was further improved when we added the constraint that the efficient equilibrium be incentive compatible in the sense of being “cheating” proof. For those households still able to attain utility payoffs on the Pareto frontier, the set of Pareto weights required to implement an incentive compatible outcome was further reduced with respect to the CPO specification. The set of Pareto weights that could produce utility outcomes on the Pareto frontier was empty for about 5

percent of households. Their time allocations were determined in Nash equilibrium.

When constraints are imposed on the Pareto weight formulation of the household time allocation problem, a constant population value of the “notional” Pareto weight must be adjusted to satisfy the time constraints. This produces what we might term model-induced “structural” heterogeneity in the *ex post* Pareto weights associated with the efficient outcomes in the population. We find that the Pareto models with side constraints produce significant amounts of heterogeneity in the *ex post* Pareto weight distributions. Under the Constrained Pareto Optimality (CPO) specification, more than 40 percent of cases had an *ex post* Pareto weight unequal to the notional Pareto weight of 0.5. Under the Endogenous Interaction specification, less than 10 percents of efficient households had an *ex post* Pareto weight equal to 0.5. On the basis of these results, we conclude that it is quantitatively important to consider the *ex post* heterogeneity induced by behavioral constraints that results in substantial heterogeneity in implied Pareto weights even when the notional Pareto weight is constant in the population. This finding is consistent with that of Mazzocco’s (2007) analysis, which supports the dynamic adjustment of Pareto weights to satisfy evolving participation constraints.

In this paper we have only considered the impact of adding two particular side constraints to the efficient allocation problem. In terms of the CPO specification, we added the constraint that each spouse receive at least what they would in Nash equilibrium. A number of bargaining-based models of household behavior assume that the outside option for each spouse is the value of being single. Conceptually, adding further constraints to the efficient allocation problem is straightforward, and, as we have seen, adding such constraints allows for a better correspondence between household time allocations observed in the data and those generated by the model. Extending such frameworks to a realistic dynamic setting which allowed for the possibility of inefficient household allocations would also considerably increase the appeal of the Pareto-weight approach to the analysis of household behavior.

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Table 1
PSID 2005 Sample
Means and (Standard Deviations)

$N = 823$

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Husband</i>	<i>Wife</i>
h	45.706 (8.546)	38.588 (10.512)
τ	7.787 (6.418)	14.920 (9.428)
w	22.009 (13.626)	15.823 (9.327)
Y	118.151 (182.526)	

Table 2
Correlation Matrix of Observables

	h_1	τ_1	h_2	τ_2	w_1	w_2	Y
h_1	1.000	-0.017	0.093	0.060	0.029	-0.004	0.084
τ_1		1.000	0.081	0.321	-0.031	-0.026	0.024
h_2			1.000	-0.189	-0.132	0.084	0.011
τ_2				1.000	-0.018	-0.137	0.066
w_1					1.000	0.294	0.115
w_2						1.000	0.026

Table 3
Estimates of Primitive Parameters
Means and (Standard Deviations) of Fixed Effects Distributions

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>Behavioral Specification</i>		
	NE	PO	CPO
λ_1	0.369 (0.095)	0.580 (0.166)	0.531 (0.106)
λ_2	0.302 (0.102)	0.430 (0.158)	0.456 (0.120)
δ_1	0.075 (0.057)	0.075 (0.057)	0.075 (0.057)
δ_2	0.106 (0.066)	0.106 (0.066)	0.106 (0.066)
α		0.500	0.500

Table 4
Estimates of Primitive Parameter Moments
Flexible Parametric Specification
Means and (Standard Deviations)

	<i>NE</i>	<i>PO</i>	<i>CPO</i>	<i>EI</i>
λ_1	0.355 (0.247)	0.474 (0.088)	0.489 (0.197)	0.484 (0.094)
λ_2	0.315 (0.196)	0.432 (0.112)	0.495 (0.229)	0.472 (0.137)
δ_1	0.138 (0.158)	0.065 (0.050)	0.074 (0.070)	0.067 (0.065)
δ_2	0.178 (0.216)	0.152 (0.162)	0.099 (0.029)	0.121 (0.100)
β				0.522 (-)
α (<i>Actual</i>)		0.500 (-)	0.509 (0.044)	0.528 (0.057)
Proportion PF	0	1	1	0.941
Proportion $\alpha = 0.5$			0.591	0.092
Distance Measure	4897.747	5014.291	4209.456	3991.784

Table A.1
Moments Used in the MSM Estimator

Sample Characteristic	Sample Value
Average h_1	45.706
Average h_2	38.588
Average τ_1	7.787
Average τ_2	14.920
St. Dev. h_1	8.546
St. Dev. h_2	10.512
Average ($h_1 \times h_2$)	1772.074
Average ($h_1 \times Y$)	5530.755
Average ($h_2 \times Y$)	4580.739
Average ($h_1 \times w_1$)	1009.293
Average ($h_2 \times w_2$)	618.773
Average ($\tau_1 \times Y$)	947.620
Average ($\tau_2 \times Y$)	1876.535
St. Dev. τ_1	6.418
St. Dev. τ_2	9.423
Average ($h_1 \times w_2$)	722.880
Average ($h_2 \times w_1$)	830.367
Average ($h_1 \geq 40$)	0.955
Average ($h_2 \geq 40$)	0.694
Average ($25 \leq h_1 < 40$)	0.0346
Average ($25 \leq h_2 < 40$)	0.210




Figure 1
Critical β Values




Figure 2
Pareto Frontier and Admissible Solutions

Figure 3.a
Distribution of α
Constrained Pareto Optimal Specification
(Excludes Cases with $\alpha = 0.5$)




Figure 3.b
Distribution of α
Endogenous Interaction Specification
(Excludes Efficient Cases with $\alpha = 0.5$)




Figure 4.a
Spousal Preference Parameters
Nash Equilibrium




Figure 4.b
Spousal Productivity Parameters
Nash Equilibrium




Figure 4.c
Husbands' Primitive Parameters
Nash Equilibrium




Figure 4.d
Wives' Primitive Parameters
Nash Equilibrium




Figure 5.a
Spousal Preference Parameters
Pareto Weight




Figure 5.b
Spousal Productivity Parameters
Pareto Weight




Figure 5.c
Husbands' Primitive Parameters
Pareto Weight




Figure 5.d
Wives' Primitive Parameters
Pareto Weight




Figure 6.a
Spousal Preference Parameters
Constrained Pareto Optimal




Figure 6.b
Spousal Productivity Parameters
Constrained Pareto Optimal




Figure 6.c
Husbands' Primitive Parameters
Constrained Pareto Optimal




Figure 6.d
Wives' Primitive Parameters
Constrained Pareto Optimal




Figure 7.a
Spousal Preference Parameters
Endogenous Interaction




Figure 7.b
Spousal Productivity Parameters
Endogenous Interaction




Figure 7.c
Husbands' Primitive Parameters
Endogenous Interaction




Figure 7.d
Wives' Primitive Parameters
Endogenous Interaction




Figure 8.a
Welfare Outcomes
Nash Equilibrium




Figure 8.b
Welfare Outcomes
Pareto Optimal




Figure 8.c
Welfare Outcomes
Constrained Pareto Optimal




Figure 8.d
Welfare Outcomes
Endogenous Interaction

